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UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, § 5:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ITS
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
LAWRENCE P. KINGt
I. INTRODUCTION
The allocation of stock dividends received by a trustee to either
income or corpus has been a recurring problem perplexing the courts
for many years. The competing principles, designated as the Penn-
sylvania,, Massachusetts, 2 and Kentucky 3 rules have each gained
judicial recognition,4 but not all problems created by the declaration
of stock dividends have been solved.5
t Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. See Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473, 105 A.2d 353 (1954); Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa.
368 (1857). See also 3 Scott, Trusts § 236.3 (2d ed. 1956).
2. See Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). See also 3 Scott, op. cit. supra
note 1.
3. See Laurent v. Randolf, 306 Ky. 134, 206 S.W.2d 480 (1947) (liquidation
dividend of corporation belonged to life tenant). The Kentucky rule had little
support and is of no prominence at the present time.
4. The following cases illustrate the Pennsylvania rule: In the Matter of
Estate of Duffill, 180 Cal. 748, 183 Pac. 337 (1919) ; Estate of Heard, 10% Cal.
App. 2d 225, 236 P.2d 810 (1951); Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215, 110 N.W.
599 (1907); Northern Central Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 94 Atl. 338 (1915);
Goodwin v. McGaughy, 108 Minn. 248, 122 N.W. 6 (1909); Simpson v. Millsaps,
80 Miss. 239, 31 So. 912 (1902); Day v. Faulks, 79 N.J. Eq. 66, 81 Atl. 354
(Ch. 1911), aff'd, 81 N.J. Eq. 173, 88 Atl. 384 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912); In the
Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913); Pritchett v. Nashville
Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S.W. 1064 (1896) ; In re Heaton's Estate, 89 Vt. 550,
96 At]. 21 (1915); Will of Jenkins, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929). The fol-
lowing cases illustrate the Massachusetts rule: American Sec. & Trust Co. v.
Frost, 117 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941); First
Nat'l Bank of Tuskaloosa v. Hill, 241 Ala. 606, 4 So. 2d 170 (1941); Citizens & So.
Nat'l Bank v. Fleming, 181 Ga. 116, 181 S.E. 768 (1935); Burns v. Hines,
298 IlI. App. 563, 19 N.E.2d 382 (1939); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935) ; Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331,
104 Atl. 515 (1918); In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878 (1929);
Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927); United
States Trust Co. v. Cowin, 121 Neb. 427, 237 N.W. 284 (1931); Lamb v.
Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276 (1924); Stipe v. First Nat'l Bank,
208 Ore. 251, 301 P.2d 175 (1956); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker,
51 R.I. 507, 155 Atl. 661 (1931); Kirby v. Western Sur. Co., 68 S.D. 612,
5 N.W.2d 405 (1942); Bergin v. Bergin, 315 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1958); Kaufman
v. Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 93 Va. 673, 25 S.E. 1003 (1896); Security Trust
Co. v. Rammelsburg, 82 W. Va. 701, 97 S.E. 122 (1918).
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The Pennsylvania rule would allocate the dividends according to
the time when the income beneficiary's interest was created and the
time when the earnings were accumulated. Stock dividends repre-
senting earnings accumulated prior to the creation of the life interest
would belong wholly to corpus; those representing earnings accumu-
lated subsequent to the creation of the life interest would belong to
income; those representing earnings accumulated during both periods
of time would be apportioned between corpus and income.
Under the Massachusetts rule, all stock dividends would be deemed
to belong to corpus. This rule was ultimately incorporated into the
Uniform Principal and Income Act,6 which has been widely adopted,7
and which has been useful in doing away with almost impossible
accounting tasks inherent in the Pennsylvania doctrine. It was
promulgated to curb expensive and multitudinous calculations and
litigation as regards the trusts to which it can be made applicable.
However, the question has arisen concerning the trusts to which it
may be applied.
Many trusts in existence today, which include corporate stock as
part or all of the corpus, were created prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Act. Corporations whose stock is so held have subsequently
declared various types of stock distributions which required judicial
classification and allocation. 8 Would it be possible to eliminate the
double problem by a retroactive application of a statute allocating
such stock distributions?
Two cases have dealt with the constitutional validity of the
5. See Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham & Chaos, Ways Out of Apportionment
Dilemma, 98 Trusts & Estates 924 (1959); Comment, 32 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 878
(1957).
6. Uniform Principal and Income Act § 5.
7. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 58, §§ 75-87 (1960); Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 14-1081 to
14-1096 (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-4-1 to 57-4-16 (Supp. 1957); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-110 to 45-119 (1958); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 690.01-690.15
(1944); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-901 to 58-913 (Supp. 1959); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§§ 386.190-386.340 (1960); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:17,92, 9:2091-9:2101 (1950);
Md. Ann. Code art. 75B, §§ 1-10 (1957); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-5-1 to 33-5-17
(Supp. 1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 37-1 to 37-15 (1950); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
60, §§ 175.26-175.36 (1949); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 3470.1-3470.15 (Purdon
Supp. 1959); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 35-701 to 35-715 (Supp. 1960); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-4, 7425b-26 to 7425b-36 (Vernon 1960); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 22-3-1 to 22-3-15 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 3301-3313 (1959);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-253 to 55-268 (1959); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 3581(6)-
3581(22) (1955); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 231.40(1)-(12) (Supp. 1960).
8. For the distinction between a stock dividend and a stock split see, e.g., In the
Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 228 (1958) (stock dividend);
Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959) (stock split, therefore, no
apportionment; seemingly a retreat from Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67
A.2d 124 [1949] and its holding of nonapplicability of the Uniform Act).
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application of the retroactive provision of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, and have reached contrary conclusions. Crawford
Estate9 declared unconstitutional the Pennsylvania version of the
statute permitting retroactivity on the ground that the life bene-
ficiary's interest was vested and to apply the statutory rule would
deprive the beneficiary of his property without due process. 10 There-
fore, the Pennsylvania rule, judicially adopted and abrogated by the
statute, would still be applicable to trusts in existence prior to the
passage of the Act. On the other hand, Will of Allis" con-
cluded that the life beneficiary did not have such a property right
that the legislature or the court could not affect by adopting new
rules of allocation. Basically then, the nature of the property right
of the income beneficiary will be determinative of its susceptibility
to subsequent modification.
II. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
Prohibition of retrospective lawmaking is not new. Its develop-
ment in ancient Greek times, through the Roman law and into the
common law system is well documented." Even in the absence of
express provision in the United States Constitution, it was early held
that legislation affecting prior rights or duties already created was
repugnant to the basic jurisprudential system.3 Justice Story defined
a retroactive law as follows:
Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obli-
gation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be
deemed retrospective; . .. .
The many cases striking down retrospective legislation relied
principally upon either the general rule of law, 5 not contained in the
federal constitution, or upon some provision of a state constitution if
9. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949). See also Pew Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67
A.2d 129 (1949).
10 U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959).
12. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle
of Jurisprudence, 20 MNinn. L. Rev. 775 (1936).
13. Inhabitants of Goshen v. Inhabitants of Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822);
Benson v. Mayor of N. Y., 10 Barb. 223 (N. Y. 1850). See Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See also I Blackstone, Commentaries 46 (1847);
Dwarris, Statutes 162 (Potter ed. 1885); Story, Constitution, §§ 1398, 1399
(5th ed. 1891).
14. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756,
767 (No. 13156) (C.C.N.H. 1814).
15. See Scurlock, Retroactive Legislation Affecting Interests in Land 9-18
(1953).
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there was one to be applied. 6 However, resort was had to the
fourteenth amendment shortly after its adoption and the due process
clause supplied the basis of many holdingsY The general principle
evolved from this clause is that "vested rights may not be impaired."
This would promote simple application if the words had a set
meaning, but the key terms "vested rights" are not such words.
One's first impulse on undertaking to discuss retroactive laws
and vested rights is to define a vested right. But when it
appears, as soon happens, that this is impossible, one decides
to fix the attention upon retroactive laws and leave the matter
of definition to follow rather than precede the discussion, assum-
ing for the purpose that a right is vested when it is immune to
destruction, and that it is not vested when it is liable to destruc-
tion, by retroactive legislation.' 8
Put another way, "vested rights" is a label affixed after analysis of
the facts in controversy and forms part of the conclusion reached
rather than being the means of determination. The controversy will
concern specifically the nature of the interest affected by the legis-
lation, for that classification will be determinative of the constitu-
tional question. The lack of uniformity of conclusion regarding the
nature of the interest illustrates the difficulties of application of
the term "vested rights" and, as will be seen, each new factual
situation can raise again the same problems previously handled in
other settings. Retrospective legislation has affected other types of
property interests but the results have not always been consistent.
To round out the present discussion, there follows a brief examina-
tion of these other interests and then a more detailed exposition of
problems inherent in trust administration.
III. PARTICULAR PROPERTY INTERESTS
Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession
Once the statutory period has run and the other requisites for
adverse possession are met, it has been held unconstitutional for the
legislature to lengthen the period of limitations so as to permit a
prior owner to eject the one in possession. 0 This is well settled
although the typical statute does not in words convey or vest title, but
merely bars the owner's action. However, the courts have found
16. Ibid.
17. "At present the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
favored resort against legislative excesses and has greatly overshadowed the
Bill of Rights of the state constitutions as a protection against deprivation of
property." Scurlock, op. cit. supra note 15, at 12.
18. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Texas L. Rev. 231 (1927).
19. Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403 (1934); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.
620 (1885).
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the loss of title to be part and parcel of the policy of the statute and
when all statutory requirements are met, title vests in the one holding
adversely.
Interestingly enough, limitations statutes involving non-property
actions are not subject to the same prohibition.20 Apparently, there
is no vested right in a defense to a contract or tort action based on
the running of the statute so that a statute lengthening the time
within which suit may be brought, made applicable to existing but
previously barred claims, will be upheld. There is, however, some
contrary authority applying the due process clause to these situations,
which would prevent retroactive application of the statutes from
prohibiting the assertion of an existing defense.21
It would not be accurate to say that there is a vested interest in
the existing statute of limitations. Prior to the running of the limi-
tations period, the legislature may take any action concerning the
statute regardless of the expectations of interested parties.22 The
period may be shortened, but not so as immediately to bar a claim of
the owner. ;- He would have to be given a reasonable period within
which to assert his right not yet barred.
Therefore, as regards title acquired by adverse possession, once
the statutory conditions have been met, the rights of the parties
have become fixed and the possessor has a present interest. Until the
claim is barred, however, the possessor has an expectancy subject
to modification by the legislature. Moreover, the owner's present
interest may be changed contrary to his expectations as long as he
is given an opportunity to assert his claim. The policy of the legis-
lature is met in that some certainty will be given to land titles and
property will not be held inalienable too long (as expressed by
statute) ; on the other hand, modifications and changes to meet new
policy considerations as appear appropriate to the lawmaking body
will not be hampered by unnecessary limitations and restrictions.
20. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt,
supra note 19; Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 24 N.E.2d 676 (1940); Gal-
lewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950).
21. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N.E. 1025 (1895);
State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950); Ireland v. Mac-
Kintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 Pac. 901 (1900).
22. Paragould v. Lawson, 88 Ark. 478, 115 S.W. 379 (1908); Billings v.
Hall, 7 Cal. 1 (1857); Cox v. Berry, 13 Ga. 306 (1853); Keith v. Keith, 26
Kan. 26 (1881); Lambert v. Slingerland, 25 Minn. 457 (1879); Cole v. Van
Ostrand, 131 Wis. 454, 110 N.W. 884 (1907).
23. Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190
(1922). See Annots., 49 A.L.R. 1264 (1927), 120 A.L.R. 758 (1939).
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Estate Jure Uxoris
Prior to the Married Women's Property Acts,2 the husband had a
life estate in the property of the wife belonging to her at or subse-
quent to the time of the marriage.25 The acts, stripping the husband
of this estate, created conflicts of opinion regarding the constitu-
tionality of their retrospective operation. Such acts were held un-
constitutional when applied to existing marriages and property
already acquired by the wife,26 but properly applicable to property
acquired subsequent to the statute.27
Curtesy
The estate jure uxoris terminated at the death of the wife, but if
issue were born alive of the marriage, the husband had an estate of
curtesy initiate which became consummate at the death of the wife.
The courts have held that the rights incident to the estate of curtesy
initiate could not be violated by the Married Women's Acts under the
due process clause of the federal and state constitutions.2 The
vested right of the husband, however, did not come into being until
marriage, birth of issue, actual seizin of the wife, and her death, so
that the absence of any one requirement at the time of the promulga-
tion of the statute made the act applicable as of that date.2D
There was difference of opinion and result regarding the statutory
abolition of curtesy consummate where curtesy initiate had already
attached. Some states, such as New Jersey, considered the statutes
unconstitutional if applied retroactively.30 Apparently, the right of
the husband was considered vested as of the time of the birth of
issue.
Other states give validity to enactments cutting off rights of
24. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 171-85 (1935).
25. 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 484 (3d ed. 1939). '
26. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Lee, 69 Ind. 117 (1879); Holmes v. Holmes, 4
Barb. 295 (N.Y. 1848).
27. Conn v. White, 189 Ky. 185, 224 S.W. 764 (1920); Sleight v. Read, 18
Barb. 159 (N.Y. 1854); Taft v. Cannon, 34 Atl. 148 (R.I. 1896) Alexander
v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335 (1888). See Scurlock, Retroactive Legisla-
tion Affecting Interests in Land 279 (1953).
28. Junction R.R. v. Harris, 9 Ind. 184 (1857); White v. White, 5 Barb.
474 (N.Y. 1849). See Scurlock, op. cit. supra note 27, at 280-81.
29. Allen v. Hanks, 136 U.S. 300 (1889).
30. E.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 144 Ill. 274, 33 N.E. 51 (1893); Mitchell v.
Violett, 104 Ky. 77, 47 S.W. 195 (1898); Anastasia v. Anastasia, 138 N.J. Eq.
260, 47 A.2d 879 (Ch. 1946); Walker v. Bennett, 107 N.J. Eq. 151, 152 Atl. 9
(Ch. 1930).
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curtesy consummate on the theory that the Married Women's Acts
have so affected curtesy initiate as to leave only a mere expectancy
similar to dower.'
Doiwer
The only protection accorded dower has been after the husband's
death, at which time the right is vested and may not be divested
statutorily.'- However, inchoate dower has been susceptible to
partial or total destruction, even as regards property acquired by
the husband prior to the enactment.3 3 Why distinctions were made
between the husband's interests (estate jure uxoris and curtesy) and
those of the wife is not clear.
But in comparison with the husband, the wife has indeed been
treated shabbily by the courts. Few courts have felt the neces-
sity for examining into the reason why curtesy and the estate
jure uxoris were frequently deemed to be "vested rights" while
dower was, and is, treated as a mere encumbrance on the hus-
band's power of alienation whenever the wife seeks to assert
constitutional rights in her marital estate.3 4
Sfatutory Marital Rights
With the abolition of curtesy and dower, a statutory distributive
share was decreed to each spouse.3 This interest in property belong-
ing to one spouse at the other's death may be changed prior to
death by the legislature; "it is not probable that the courts would
recognize any kind of vested interest in the continued existence of
such statute.", However, if the interest attaches to any property
belonging to the deceased spouse during the marriage, a present
31. McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N.E. 681 (1892); Hill v. Chambers,
30 Mich. 422 (1874); Duncan v. Duncan, 324 Mo. 167, 23 S.W.2d 91 (1929);
Moninger v. Ritner, 104 Pa. 298 (1883); Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202
S.W. 911 (1918).
32. Swartz v. Andrews, 137 Iowa 261, 114 N.W. 888 (1908); McAllister
v. Dexter & P. R.R., 106 Me. 371, 76 Ati. 891 (1910); Talbot v. Talbot, 14 R.I. 57
(1882).
33. See Randall v. Krieger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1874); Fletcher v.
Felker, 97 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Ark. 1951) ; Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533 (1860) ;
Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (1941); Steinhagen v. Trull, 320
Ill. 382, 151 N.E. 250 (1926); May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575 (1872); Sturdevant
v. Norris, 30 Iowa 65 (1870); Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac.
137 (1891); Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164 (1866); In re Lawrence, 1 Redf.
Surr. 310 (N.Y. 1848); Ruby v. Ruby, 112 W. Va. 62, 163 S.E. 717 (1932);
Bennett v. Harris, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N.W. 222 (1881); cf. Russell v. Rumsey, 35
Ill. 362 (1864); In re Alexander, 53 N.J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817 (Ch. 1894).
34. Scurlock, Retroactive Legislation Affecting Interests in Land 293 (1953).
35. See 2 Powell, Real Property § 217, 218 (1950).
36. Scurlock, op. cit. supra note 34, at 296.
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interest is created. There is no power of disposition over it, but the
marital right may effectively restrain its alienation by the owning
spouse. The expectancy created is similar to inchoate dower. These
interests should be subject to legislative modification before becom-
ing vested, that is, prior to the death of the owning spouse; and the
cases indicate that the statutorily created rights are to be treated
in the same manner as common law dower, with resultant power in
the legislature to change or abolish the interest.
37
Conclusions
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the doctrine prohibiting
the "impairment of vested rights" has received different treatment
throughout a wide range of property interests and that even within
the same classification, courts may reach different conclusions. Each
interest has been separately examined with little or no reference to
others closely allied to it. In each case, the conflict involved a clash
between a general policy enunciated by the legislature and individual
interests in particular property. The resultant efficacy or invalidity
given the statute was dependent upon categorization of the right,
whether or not vested in the constitutional sense, but as mentioned
earlier, this categorization simply reflects the conclusion reached,
and not the means used to reach it.
Turning to various problems that can arise in the administration
of a trust, it is apparent that retroactive legislation has not only
been attempted, but on the whole, it has been held properly enacted.
IV. TRUST ADMINISTRATION
The rules regarding allocation properly come within the general
area of trust administration. Historically, these rules were developed
for administration purposes. The Pennsylvania rule was based on
impartiality of treatment between income and corpus beneficiaries,
but its complexity caused it to be discarded in favor of the Massachu-
setts rule which, admittedly, is one of convenience. 38 Just as other
rules concerned with trust administration can be changed judicially
or statutorily with retroactive application, these allocation rules
should likewise be recognized as subject to change without the neces-
sity of inquiry into "vested" or "expectancy" rights.
37. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (1941); Hamblin
v. Marchant, 104 Kan. 689, 180 Pac. 811 (1919); Griswold v. McGee, 102 Minn.
114, 112 N.W. 1020, aff'd, 102 Minn. 235, 113 N.W. 382 (1907); Lane v. St.
Louis Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 201 S.W.2d 288 (1947); Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa.
33, 148 Atl. 37 (1929); Ruby v. Ruby, 112 W. Va. 62, 168 S.E. 717 (1932); cf.
O'Kelley v. Williams, 84 N.C. 241 (1881).
38. See Dunham, A Trustee's Dilemma As to Principal and Income, 26 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1959).
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A. Rules of Trust Administration Other Than Those of Allocation
Trust In ,estments
One illustration of an aspect of trust administration subject to
change is that of proper or improper investments. If a trustee makes
an improper investment which later becomes a proper one, he will
not be surcharged if no loss has been incurred in the interim period.
3 9
If, on the other hand, the investments were proper when made, but
subsequently became improper, the trustee is under a duty to dispose
of those securities.-" The statutes relating to legal investments are
subject to constant change and serve to regulate the powers of the
trustee in his administration of the trust estate as of the effective
date of the new law, rather than the law as it existed at the time of
the creation of the trust.-
Compensation
Another example clearly falling within administration is that of
the trustee's compensation. Almost all states have statutes providing
for such compensation.42 Where compensation is fixed by statute,
the amount thereof will depend upon the law as it stands at the time
compensation is awarded and not at the time of the testator's death.43
It is interesting to note that Pennsylvania has held it to be a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment to apply such a statute retro-
actively 14 At least a measure of consistency has been achieved by
the similar results reached in this determination and in the Crawford
case, although in both cases, it is submitted, the court was in error.
39. Humphiies v. Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tenn. 17, 122
S.W.2d 446 (1938). See also 3 Scott, Trusts § 230.5 (2d ed. 1956); In the
Matter of Crawford, 207 Misc. 145, 136 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Geld-
macher v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 788, 25 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
1940).
40. See 3 Scott, Trusts § 231 (2d ed. 1956).
41. Mechanicks Nat'l Bank v. Brady, 100 N.H. 469, 129 A.2d 857 (1957);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93 A.2d 321 (1952); In the
Matter of Jackson, 282 App. Div. 690, 122 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1953); In re Flynn's
Estate, 205 Okla. 311, 237 P.2d 903 (1951); Brown Estate, 85 Pa. D.&C. 452
(Orphans' Ct. Del. County. 1953); Goodridge v. National Bank of Commerce
200 Va. 511, 106 S.E.2d 598 (1959); Will of Yates, 259 Wis. 263, 48 N.W.2d
601 (1951).
42. See 3 Scott, Trusts § 242 (2d ed. 1956).
43. In re Donovan's Estate, 266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934); Phraner v.
Stone, 137 N.J. Eq. 284, 44 A.2d 504 (Ch. 1945); Petition of Tuckerman, 60 N.Y.
S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
44. Williamson Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951).
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Supervision of the Court
The terms of the Oklahoma Trust Act,45 relating to supervision
and control of the court over trust agreements were held applicable
to trusts created and in existence prior to the effective date of the
statute.4 6 It expressly provided coverage to "All other wills and
trust agreements ... in so far as such terms do not impair the obli-
gation of contract or deprive persons of property without due process
of law under the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma or the United
States of America. 14 7 Methods of procedure or change of remedy are
subject to reasonable legislative action without violating due process
concepts.4 8 There is no vested right in any manner of procedure so as
to deprive the state from adopting, in its judgment, the best mode
adaptable to the interests sought to be protected."
Spendthrift Trusts
Although this is not an administration problem, it is interesting
to note that there is a conflict regarding the constitutionality of
retroactive statutes removing restraints on alienation of the bene-
ficiary's interest under a spendthrift trust. Brearley School v.
Ward50 upheld the validity of a statute which permitted a judgment
creditor to reach ten percent of the income from a testamentary trust
created prior to enactment of the statute. However, in State v.
Caldwell,51 and in Borsch Estate,5 2 statutes were held unconstitu-
tional which permitted voluntary or involuntary alienation of spend-
thrift trusts created prior to adoption of the statutes. The Pennsyl-
vania court said, "To permit a termination by agreement or release
would be an invasion of the donor's property right."53
As Professor Scott states:
[I]t is difficult to see how there is anything unconstitutional
in giving the beneficiary a privilege which he did not have when
the trust was created. No one is deprived of any interest in
property. It is difficult to accept the view that the deceased
testator who created the trust is deprived of anything.
45. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175.53 (1949).
46. Swanson v. Bates, 202 Okla. 128, 211 P.2d 781 (1949).
47. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175.53 (1949).
48. Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Swanson v. Bates, 202
Okla. 128, 211 P.2d 781 (1949).
49. Ibid.
50. 201 N.Y. 358, 94 N.E. 1001 (1911).
51. 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W.2d 624 (1944).
52. 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949).
53. Id. at 586, 67 A.2d at 121.
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There are other situations in which courts have had no diffi-
culty in applying to trusts statutory provisions enacted after the
creation of the trustA'
Mortgage Salvage Operations
More analogous, perhaps, to the immediate problem would be
those questions of allocation arising under trusts where the res
consisted of mortgages in default. The rights of life beneficiary and
remainderman conflict where such non-income-producing property
is sold by the trustee and he holds the proceeds for distribution. The
one case construing a statute5 allocating the proceeds as to subse-
quent and prior trusts held its retrospective application constitu-
tional.b Both the New York court and the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to classify the remainderman's interest as
"vested," holding that prior law had been in a state of flux and
subject to change by either the court or the legislature.
Prior to the statute, it was discretionary with the trustee to order
payments to the income beneficiary during the salvage period from
surplus income,5 7 but there was much hesitancy to act because of
the possibility of being surcharged if overpayment was made.58 As
a result, no income was disbursed during this period. The statute
sought to correct this situation by allotting up to three percent of
the face value of the mortgage to the life beneficiary out of the net
income earned during the salvage period, without the threat of sur-
charge.
As Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
What appears really to have been taken from the remainder-
man is his right to question the equity of the rule in his indi-
vidual circumstances, a right which he had while it was a rule
of the court.5
Regarding the law of trusts generally, and especially applicable to
the instant discussion, is Jackson's specific direction that administra-
tion problems must be met by legislation reflecting current conditions,
and not be hamstrung by older rules inconsistent with later develop-
ments.
The whole cluster of vexatious problems arising from uses
and trusts, mortmain, the rule against perpetuities, the testa-
54. 2 Scott, Trusts 1055 (2d ed. 1956).
55. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-c.
56. In the Matter of Estate of West, 289 N.Y. 423, 46 N.E.2d 501 (1943),
aff'd sub nom. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
57. In the Matter of the Will of Chapal, 269 N.Y. 464, 199 N.E. 762 (1936).
58. In the Matter of Estate of West, 175 Misc. 1044, 26 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Surr.
Ct. 1941).
59. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1944).
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mentary directions for accumulations or for suspensions of the
power of alienation, is one whose history admonishes against
unnecessary rigidity. The state may extend the testamentary
privilege on terms which permit tying up of property in trust
for possibly longer periods. But the state on creation of such a
trust does not lose power to devise new and reasonable direc-
tions to the trustee to meet new conditions arising during its
administration, such as the depression presented to trusts hold-
ing mortgages.60
B. Rules of Allocation Among Trust Beneficiaries
There may be rules of allocation in existence, judicially or statu-
torily created, at the time of the creation of the trust interests which
rules are subsequently changed for one reason or another. May the
new rules be applied to the existing interests? In Franklin v. Margay
Oil Corp.,61 a negative conclusion was reached because, as the court
held, the new rule of apportionment increasing income and reducing
corpus, if applied to existing trusts, would deprive the remaindermen
of property without due process of law.
In this area, while the law is far from settled, it has become
increasingly important to examine closely the rights of the respec-
tive parties. By their nature, trusts are administered over a long
period of time during which business conditions and practices are
liable to undergo vast changes. Many trusts in existence today were
created in the 1920's, at a time when the present day difficulties of dis-
tinguishing between principal and income did not exist. The use of
the stock dividend and stock split in recent years has focused atten-
tion on this problem of definition, 62 but unless the solutions offered
can be applied to existing trusts, they will have no effect in assisting
trust administration until quite some time in the future03
The previously discussed Crawford Estate case is in point.0 4 Testa-
tor directed that all stock dividends should be part of the corpus of
the trust which took effect on his death in 1935. The trustee received
stock dividends from three companies, whose stock formed part of
the corpus. When the trust was created, the Pennsylvania rule of
apportionment was the judicially declared law.20 In 1945, the state
60. Id. at 48.
61. 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944).
62. See, e.g., Matter of Bingham, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.E.2d 301 (1959); Cun-
ningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959).
63. The only trusts to which new rules of apportionment could be applied
would be those becoming effective subsequent to the adoption of the new rules.
All other trusts, in existence at the time of the promulgation of the apportion-
ment rules, would be subject only to pre-existing law.
64. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
65. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927); Earp's Appeal,
28 Pa. 368 (1857).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss4/2
UNIFORMI PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
legislature adopted the Massachusetts rule by promulgating the
Uniform Principal and Income Act." The issue before the court
was whether the judicial rule created a vested property right in the
income beneficiary, in which case the retroactive provision of the
Uniform Act- would be unconstitutional, or as contended by the
remaindermen, the Pennsylvania rule gave the life tenant a contin-
gent, inchoate right, a mere expectancy subject to legislative modifi-
cation. The court held that the life tenant's interest was vested.
A gift of an equitable life estate in "income" is a grant of a
rested property interest. The Leglislature may not thereafter
qualify or extinguish it. Where part of the trust corpus con-
sisted of corporate stock, this Court possessed the power, in the
absence of then existing Legislative enactment, to -define and
measure what constituted or was included in the term "income."
In so defining and measuring such "income," we decided what
cash or property passed to the life tenant and at what time.
Such "income" thus defined became a vested property interest.68
As for the argument that there is no vested right in a rule of law,
the court concluded that:
This is true, except where such r zle of law has established a
vested property interest. Where a decision of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania declares an interest to be vested, no retroactive
statutory enactment can modify or extinguish it.69
Because the stock dividends constituted income, the settlor's direction
awarding them to corpus was void as violative of the statute against
accumulations .7
Precisely why the property interest of the life tenant is vested
is not made clear. It does not appear to be any more substantial or
definite than inchoate dower. There may or may not be declarations
of stock dividends by the corporations during the existence of the life
tenancy and the very presence of income available for distribution
is purely speculative. Whether or not any rule of apportionment has
greater merit than another is irrelevant, except that the policy
declared by the legislature should prevail where it does not take
away property belonging to one rightfully entitled thereto. It cannot
and should not be said that there is a right to this income before
distribution which is not subject to change by supervening, over-
riding policy considerations. The policy making determination is for
the court or legislature. By the same token, if the court itself decided
66. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 3470.1-3470.15 (Purdon Supp. 1959).
67. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 3471-3485, repealed by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20
§§ 3470.1-3470.15 (Purdon Supp. 1959).
68. Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 463, 67 A.2d 124, 127 (1949).
69. Id. at 467, 67 A.2d at 129.
70. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 301.6, 301.7 (Purdon 1950).
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to abandon the Pennsylvania rule and adopt the Massachusetts rule,
in the absence of statute, it too could and should be applied to
existing trusts. In Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette,'7
it was argued that the entire cash amount payable in a corporate
liquidation should go to the life tenant, as had been previously
decreed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.72 A subsequent case 7 3
however, adopted the Massachusetts rule regarding stock dividends
and awarded them to the remaindermen. At the time of testatrix'
death, Kentucky followed the rule awarding to the life tenant cash
distributions resulting from liquidation.
This rule was clearly wrong, and we believe the life tenants'
counsel in this case recognizes that it was wrong, at least to the
extent that it gave all of the liquidating distribution to the life
tenant. It must be borne in mind that we are interpreting the
rights of parties as of today. Their rights must be governed by
what we consider as current sound principles of law. In the
absence of any provisions in the will which could lead to a
different interpretation, we must presume the testatrix intended
any legal difficulties of construction arising under her will to be
solved according to the prevailing legal principles applicable to
changed conditions.7 4
The court continued, on this vital point:
It is a general principle that the overruling of a former
decision is retrospective in operation .... [W] e are confronted
with a question of construction of the will which arose only
upon the dissolution of the corporation. We are asked to con-
strue the word "income" as it related to the acts of the corpora-
tion in 1954. To say that the lifeless hand of . . . [testatrix]
should bind us to a legal concept of "income", as it existed in
her lifetime, in other lawsuits is asking too much. The function
of courts in seeking justice in the light of changing times and
concepts would largely be stultified if the legal effect of words
used in a will in one generation should create a vested right
in that construction with respect to other wills and other
parties.7 -
The same reasoning should apply with equal vigor to a change
statutorily created. It is the concept embodied within the word
"income" which gives rise to the present and past controversies.
This concept is one with which both courts and legislatures may
deal in the interests of formulating sound and fair principles of law.
71. 293 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1956).
72. Laurent v. Randolph, 306 Ky. 134, 206 S.W.2d 480 (1947).
73. Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, 267 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
74. Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, 293 S.W.2d 458, 462
(Ky. 1956).
75. Id. at 462-63,
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The use of the word in an instrument may have a completely different
meaning and application when interpreted in later years because of
changed conditions. The changes may be social or economic in
nature; they may spring from policy considerations embodied within
legislative enactments or from the business world evidenced by
generally accepted practices of corporate entities. If the changing
concepts of such a matter as income is or could be contemplated by a
settlor or testator, with all of its ramifications, he can be specific in
the declaration of his intention and his wishes will be given effect.
In the absence of such particularity, it is necessary for judicial or
statutory interpretation to govern, and this should be done in the
light of conditions existing at the later period of time. Whether or
not stock dividends, liquidation dividends, or stock splits would arise
in the future in connection with corporations whose stock forms part
of the corpus of a trust, probably was never considered by the settlor;
if it was so considered, he could have made his desires known with
the use of specific, directive language. Where there is no expression
of intent, and the matter is left to judicial or legislative control, it
is difficult to see where or how any vested property right is created
in favor of life tenants or remaindermen in property not in existence
and not even contemplated. The most recent case raising the same
issue is Will of Allis.7" decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
wherein the trustee petitioned for instructions for the allocation,
either to principal or income, of a stock dividend the trustee had
received.
Wisconsin had adopted the Uniform Principal and Income Act
77
which purported to apply to trusts in existence at the date of its
passage, and, as in Crawford Estate,"9 the constitutional question
of retroactivity was faced squarely by the court.
In 1911, the Wisconsin court accepted the Pennsylvania rule of
allocation", and this had been followed during the ensuing years in
a number of cases. 1 Finding that both the court itself and the
legislature could effectively change the rule and apply the change to
existing trusts, the court concluded that:
76. 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959).
77. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 231.40(1)-(12) (Supp. 1960).
78. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 231.40(12) (Supp. 1960).
79. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
80. Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, 131 N.W. 739 (1911).
81. E.g., Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591, 294 N.W. 29 (1940); Estate of
Paddock, 213 Wis. 409, 251 N.W. 229 (1933); Estate of Matthews, 210 Wis. 109,
245 N.W. 122 (1933); Will of Jenkins, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929);
Estate of Merrill, 193 Wis. 84, 213 N.W. 641 (1927); Miller v. Payne, 150 Wis.
364, 136 N.W. 811 (1912).
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It is fundamental that the life beneficiary possessed no vested
property right in the earnings of a corporation, shares of whose
stock constituted part of the portfolio of investments of the trust
at the time of the enactment of the Wisconsin Uniform Principal
and Income Act, prior to a declaration of a dividend by the
board of directors payable therefrom .... We consider it to be
equally clear that she also has no vested property right in the
rule with respect to the allocation of corporate stock dividends,
which had been established by the court decision and was in
effect at the time of the death of the testatrix. Therefore, it is
our considered judgment that the legislature could change such
rule with respect to any stock dividends subsequently declared
without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
amendment.82
In recent years, trustees and courts have been confronted with
complex corporate activities as they have affected trust administra-
tion.8 3 The trusts involved became effective many years before the
adoption of the Uniform Act, which did not include, in many states,
a provision giving it retroactive effect. However, in each of these
cases, the trust corpus was made up of stock of corporations that
later engaged various methods of stock distribution.
As long ago as 1915 it was said that the questions as to
whether stock dividends are to be treated as income . . . or as
corpus .. . "has perplexed the courts of both this country and
England for a century" .... The passage of time has not served
to eliminate or lessen the difficulties84
In New York, at one time or another, all three rules were in effect.8"
The Restatement of Trusts originally embodied the Massachusetts
rule.8 The rule of apportionment has been in such a state of flux
82. Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 94 N.W. 2d 226, 232 (1959).
83. See, e.g., Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 228, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976
(1958); Matter of Bingham, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.E. 2d 301 (1959); Cunningham
Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959); Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d
226 (1959). See also Cohan, Pandora's Box Revisited, 98 Trusts & Estates 655
(1959); Cohan, Observations on Cunningham and Harvey: Apportionments
Revisited, 140 The Legal Intelligencer I (Jan. 23, 1959); Niles, Fosdick,
Cunningham & Chaos, Ways Out of Apportionment Dilemma, 98 Trusts &
Estates 924 (1959); Address by Tenney, Stock Splits-The Trustee's Dilemma,
Meeting of Banking Law Section, New York State Bar Association, January
29, 1959.
84. Matter of Bingham, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 14, 163 N.E.2d, 301, 307 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
85. Before 1913, thd Kentucky rule controlled: Matter of Kernochan, 104
N.Y. 618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887). In 1913, the Pennsylvania rule was adopted:
Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913). In 1926, the Massachu-
setts rule was adopted by the legislature: N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a.
86. Restatement, Trusts § 236(b) (1935). However the 1948 supplement
contains a revision of § 236(b) in view of the trend of the courts and,
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throughout this country, 7 that it would even be possible to conclude
on this basis alone, that the beneficiary's rights are not vested. As
was mentioned earlier, whether or not a property right is vested will
determine the constitutionality of legislation affecting it; yet, it is
the finl conclusion itself from which will spring the classification of
the property right. Assuming that there are grounds for declaring
the rights to undeclared income as contingent or expectant rather
than as vested, the first and foremost inquiry is whether there is a
need to apply the new law to the existing relationship.
The main purpose behind the adoption of the Uniform Act and its
provisions governing apportionment of stock dividends, was to ease
and make more efficient trust administration. 88 Needless litigation
certainly subserves the settlor's desire in the distribution of his
property. It is an unfortunate waste for any part of his estate to be
so diverted, especially to clarify situations not within the range of
his or his draftsman's contemplation. True, the Pennsylvania rule
gave a definition of "income" as used in trust instruments, but in
the eyes of the legislatures (and courts) this definition did not serve
the purpose for which it was developed. Certainty of meaning was
apparent, but vexatious litigation was required for its application.
In New York, within the past tvo or three years, many trusts were
before the courts just on the issue of apportionment-9 although the
definition of "income" had been settled at an early date.99
With these problems in mind, and to end the controversies previ-
ously required to preserve the estate, the Uniform Act was promul-
gated. Adopting the Massachusetts rule of apportionment, it gave cer-
tainty of meaning along with ease of application. It may be that not
all will agree this rule is just and proper as compared with the others
because it is more arbitrary and less in accord with strict accounting
principles. However, the benefits derived from its very arbitrariness,
coupled with the always open opportunity for the settlor expressly
reversing itself, the American Law Institute embodied therein the Massachusetts
rule. Restatement, Trusts § 236(b) (Supp. 1948).
87. As previously noted, one rule of apportionment was adopted in Kentucky
which bore the name of that state and was then abrogated in favor of the Massa-
chusetts rule. The same development occurred in Pennsylvania. Wisconsin and
New York also changed rules. See also notes 6 and 7, supra.
88. Uniform Principal and Income Act, Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
9B U.L.A. 366 (1957).
89. See Matter of Bingham, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 14, 163 N.E.2d 301, 307 (1959);
Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 152 N.E.2d 288, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958); In
the Matter of Blake, 14 "Iisc. 2d 169, 177 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In the
Matter of the Will of Lage, 14 Misc. 2d 1043, 180 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Surr. Ct. 1958);
In re Estate of Leask, 15 Misc. 2d 545, 182 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In re
Tealdi's Trust, 16 Misc. 2d 685, 182 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
90. See notes 80, 81 and 85 supra.
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to state otherwise, surely override the waste, complications and
almost impossible results inherent in the other rules, especially
when dealing with clouded corporate maneuvers.
As previously pointed out, it may very well be considered, through
the many changes brought about by the courts and legislatures, that
the rule of apportionment in any given jurisdiction has been in a
constant state of flux. Therefore, there was no rule so firmly estab-
lished that could create vested rights in property"' and there could
be no vested right in the rule of la-w. 92
The beneficiary's interest should not be held to have become so
firmly entrenched as to present constitutional problems until such
time as there is, in fact, income. Until the corporation has declared a
distribution of income to its stockholders, there is nothing in existence
to support the beneficiary's claim. Up to that time, the courts and
legislatures should not be powerless to meet the changed conditions of
whatever nature by reevaluating existing legal doctrines. Just as in
the cases of inchoate dower as it existed under the common law,13 or of
the present day statutory interest given a spouse,14 until the conditions
are met such as death of one spouse combined with ownership of prop-
erty, the expectant right remains subject to the whim of the law-
makers. The same should hold true regarding the legal relationship
under discussion and, as one of the conditions precedent to the vesting
of a property interest is the existence of the subject matter, i.e.,
income available for distribution, the income beneficiary's right is a
mere expectancy until the condition is met. Not only should the
Pennsylvania rule be abolished, as all seem to agree, 5 but the better,
more practical Uniform Act rule should be permitted retroactive
application.
The Uniform Act is presently under consideration for revision with
particular emphasis being placed upon its application, which, if it is
to have the intended beneficial effect, must be to all trusts, both
subsequently and previously created. Section 2 (2) of the First Tenta-
tive Draft of the Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act provides:
This Act applies to the administration of all estates and trusts
whenever created as to any receipt or expense which occurs after
the effective date of this act. ...
Properly considered as a rule of trust administration, allocation of
corporate distributions between income and corpus beneficiaries
91. In the Matter of Estate of West, 289 N.Y. 423, 46 N.E.2d 501 (1943),
aff'd sub nora. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
92. Ibid.
93. See text at notes 32-34 supra.
94. See text at notes 35-37 supra.
95. See, e.g., notes 6 and 7 supra.
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should be made in accordance with the statute existing at the time the
distribution is made. To refer back to the law as it existed when the
trust was created, will necessarily make ineffective all attempts to add
certainty in administration and to take into account the inter-relation-
ships of other areas of human endeavor with these legal concepts
pertaining to trust administration.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset, the relationship of the vested rights theory to the
due process clause of the constitution was shown to be the focal issue
of the present discussion. Yet the end reached in construing a particu-
lar statute under this constitutional attack depends only on whether
this label should attach. That conclusion in turn seems to center
around other concepts, including fairness, practicality and changing
conditions. The label itself represents the conclusion and not the
reasoning. In the area of apportionment of stock distributions be-
tween income and corpus beneficiaries, the elements of fairness, prac-
ticality and changing conditions dictate that freedom be given to the
lawmaking bodies to promulgate rules applicable to existing trusts.
Their efficacy will be found wanting if limited in application to future
trusts only, for at that time, other theories of distribution may be
more just, due to changes in corporate action. The view reached in
Crawford Estate is too narrow and unrealistic for proper trust
administration, while that of Will of Allis best serves the objective
needs of all the parties concerned, including that of the courts.
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